russian missile commander almost launched nukes

“Moscow threatens and exercises limited nuclear first use, suggesting a mistaken expectation that coercive nuclear threats or limited first use could paralyze the United States and NATO and thereby end a conflict on terms favorable to Russia. These mistaken perceptions increase the prospect for dangerous miscalculation and escalation.” It mistakenly assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to “de-escalate” a conflict on terms favorable to Russia. Russian strategy and doctrine emphasize the potential coercive and military uses of nuclear weapons. “Russia considers the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to be the principal threats to its contemporary geopolitical ambitions. However, there are deep concerns among policy makers and security analysts outside Russia about whether Moscow fully embraces that idea or if it is just convenient diplomatic rhetoric.Īlso of increasing concern is a Russian military doctrine associated with battlefield nuclear weapons known as “escalate to deescalate.” This topic is of particularly interest right now with the war in Ukraine ongoing since late February 2022. Major nuclear weapons states, including Russia, have said that a nuclear war could never be won and therefore should never be fought. Indeed, it is expected that Russia’s new hypersonic weapons may be dual-capable (i.e., conventional or nuclear armed) as well. It is believed that Russia can deploy these weapons on multiple tactical systems including dual-capable short-range or theater ballistic missiles, torpedoes, and anti-ship missiles. While capable of significant destruction, these tactical nuclear weapons are lower in yield-or explosive power-and are meant for use on the battlefield against military installations or troop and equipment concentrations as opposed for use against counterforce or countervalue targets such as ICBM missile fields, command and control nodes, and or population centers (e.g., cities). > The Russian Threat: Bolstering NATO Deterrence at a Critical Time It is postulated that half of those U.S.-NATO weapons are located in the United States and half are based in Europe as part of NATO’s nuclear forces. It is similarly assessed that the United States and NATO have about 200 NSNWs in their arsenal. Indeed, Russia has nearly a 10:1 advantage over the United States and NATO in non-strategic (i.e., low-yield and short-range) nuclear weapons (NSNWs).Īssessments based on open sources estimate that Russia has about 2,000 NSNWs. But not all of Washington’s or Moscow’s nuclear weapons are covered by New START. Under the 2010 bilateral New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty-also known as New START-the United States and Russia have a similar number of deployed strategic (i.e., high-yield and long-range) nuclear weapons: 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads each. While their beliefs are entirely understandable, they are not completely correct. If asked, many Americans and Europeans probably believe that the United States and Russia are pretty evenly matched in terms of the number of nuclear weapons both sides have in their arsenals. With Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, now is a good time to take note of a little-spoken-of, but glaring, imbalance between America’s and Russia’s nuclear arsenals-and how it could affect stability in Europe and the interests of the United States and those of its European allies and partners.

Russian missile commander almost launched nukes